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CHARITY, TAXATION AND DISTRIBUTIONAL WEIGHTS 
IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
Peter G. Warr* 
Monash Universi_!y 
1. Introduction 
The use of differential weighting schemes for aggregating the 
returns from public projects across income groups has become commonplace 
in benefit-cost analysis. In the economic literature, this practice has 
received extensive support1 and somewhat less extensive criticism.2 Ob­
viously, the use of weighting schemes favouring poorer groups is motivated 
by the concern of many, if not all, economists for the alleviation of 
economic distress; but economists are not alone in feeling this way. 
Private charity is a common feature of economic life, although the degree 
to which it reduces income inequality is not always impressive. 
The present paper aims to show that the existence of private 
charity has important implications for benefit-cost analysis. In particular, 
it argues that the net returns from "small" public projects accruing to 
different income groups connected by private charitable donations from 
one to the other should be weighted equally in benefit-cost analysis. 
This holds regardless of the degree to which the existing distribution of 
income is judged to be non-optimal, whether this judgement is made before 
or after the impact of private charity is taken into account, and regardless 
of the detailed form of the government's "social welfare" function. The 
basic model is outlined in Section 2 and the central argument is presented 
in Section 3.- Section 4 then examines the degree to which this result 
is affected by allowing charitable donations to be tax-deductible. 
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2. Private Charity 
Consicier an economy containing three income groups: high, aedium 
and low. Since our ain is to focus on the distribution of income between 
rather than within groups, we shrtll treat each group as consisting of a 
single individual. Each group receives a lump sum income determined out­
side the model and yi will denote the lump sum income of group i. We 
number the groups 1 through 3 and arrange them such that y1 > y 2 > y1 • 
Each group may consume a part of its income and make voluntary donations 
to other groups with the remainder. The consumption of group i is denoted 
e i and the utility of group i will be expressed as a function of the 
consumption of all groups. 2 3 iC , C ) • The functions U 
are strictly concave, twice differentiable and non-decreasing in all arguments. 
For the clerivatives of Pi we sh--ill use the familiar notation U~ =aui /kj. 
'. 1e shall assume that prP.ferences are such that donations always take 
the form of transfers to poorer groups, although this assumption may easily 
be relaxed without disturbing the results. Group 1 (the richest) donates 
to both groups 2 and 3, group 2 donates only to group~ and group 3 (the. 
poorest) makes no donations. The consumption of each of the three groups 
is given hy 
1 1 1
C a:: y - V (1)' 
C
2 
a:: y2 - V
2 +v12 ('.!) 
and 
(3) 
wereh v i denotes t he tota1 vo1untary donat i ons of group i and v12 denotes 
that part of group l's donations going to group 7.. 
Groups 1 and 2 make their charitable donations separately. Utility 
-3-
maximization in r,roup 1 requires, for an interior solution (v
1 
> 0), that 
where A is the marginal share of group l's donations going to group 2 and 
O <A< 1. If A is determined entirely by group 1 (is a control variable- 1 1 1
for them) then,for O <A< J, A will be set such that u = u = u ; but it is 1 2 3 
possible that A will be at least partly outside the control of group 1, 
as in the case w~ere charity is administered institutionally. For utility 
maximization in group 2 we require, for v 
2 
> O, that 
2 2 (5)U2 • u3 • i 
Obviously (4) and (5) state simply that charitable donations are made 
up to the point where the marginal cost of a donation is equal to its 
marginal reward, from the point of view of the donor. 
It is important to stress at this point that private charity need 
not generate an income distribution that is "optimal" from the point of 
view of the government. Suppose government planners possess a "social 
1 2 3
welfare= function W(U , u , u ). Then W need not be maximized by private 
charity. Indeed, the redistribution of income resulting from charity may 
reduce W if the "social welfare" function is such that greater, rather than 
less, inequality is desired by the government. It seems difficult to reject 
the hypothesis that there are governments for whom this is so. Private 
charity need not even generate a distribution that is Pareto optimal in 
the usual sense. In fact, in the present model it will virtually never 
do so, provided charitable donations are made atomistically, as we have 
assumed. 
To see this in its strongest form, let group l's preferences be such 
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12 1that for v c O and v > o, u; < u!. This implies that group l's utility 
1 1 1
is maximized by setting A• 0 and that in equilibrium u1 • u > u 
For3 2· 
2 2 2 
group 2, we have from our earlier discussion u ~ u > u and for group 3,2 3 1 
U3 > u3 d u3 > u3 Now imagine gr9ups 1 and 2 to have chosen their3 1 an 3 2· 
optimal levels of voluntary donations, as above, and consider a contract 
between them committing each to raise its donation to group 3 by one unit. 
The effect on the utility of 1 each group is 
= - i = 1,2,3, ( fi) 
Such a contract would be unanimously approved; the atomistic determination 
\ . 
of charitable donations generates an equilibrium that is not Pareto optimal~ 
-s-
3. Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Now imagine the introduction of a public project having the net 
effect B
i 
on the income of group i. The effects on the consumption of the 
three groups are by definition given hy 
1 1 1
de -= -dv + B (7) 
2de = (8) 
and 
3 1 2 3
de = (1 - A)dv + dv + B. (9) 
Simply summing these equations we obtain 
B * • (10) 
i=l i=l 
We assume that the project is sufficiently "small" that equations 
(4) and (5) hold hoth before and after the project is adopted. That is, 
the adjustment by groups 1 and 2 to the income changes caused by the 
project does not lead either to move from an interior solution to its 
utility maximization problem to a corner solution. Equations (4) and (5) 
may now be totally differentiated, and together with (10) this gives the 
system 
1
1 1 1 dc B* 
dc 2 = 0 (11)Fl F2 F3 
dc3 0Gl G2 G3 
1 1 2 2where F .,. (Uli - AUl - (1 - A) u3i) and G -= (U2i - u3i) • Solving1 21 1 
this system we obtain 
i * ide = B H , i -= 1, 2, 3, (12) 
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The equilibrium change in the consumption of group i resulting from the proj e 
i * is a constant, H, multiplied by B the unweighted of the net benefits, sum 
of the project. 
.
It is easily seen from above 
i 
that the H terms must 
isum to unity. For group i, H gives the share of the aggregate benefits of 
the project which accrue, in equilibrium, to the consumption of group i. 
The point is that these shares depend on preferences and not the initial 
distributional impact of the project. Relatively weak additional assumptions 
will ensure the strict positively of each of the Hi terms. For example, if 
the utility functions are each additively separable, this result is guaran-
teed. Nevertheless, the strict positivity of the Hi terms is not implied 
by our earlier assumptions. Suppose Hi < 0 for some i. It is easy to show 
that an increase in any or all of the lump sum income terms, yj, then implies 
a fall in the equilibrium consumption of group i; in particular, an increase 
in y, i holding all other lump sum income terms constant causes group i's 
consumption to decline. This is clearly an extreme case. Obviously, since 
rH1 • 1, it is impossible for all the Hi terms to be negative, and intuitively, 
this would violate our assumption that utility functions are non-decreasing 
in all arguments. Increasing all theyi terms would then reduce both the 
consumption and the welfare of all groups. 
:'he change in the utility of group i is given by 
3 
dUi = L Ui dcj = R* : U~j * i - B K (11)
j=l j j=l j 
The negativity of one or more of the Hj terms in (13) is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for Ki< 0. Clearly, Ki< O implies that group 
i is made worse off by an increase in any or all of the yj terms, including 
i iY, and this is clearly a pathological case. Provided each of the H terms 
is positive, 
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sign (dU)i a sign (B) * , i .. 1, 2, 3. (14) 
A project benefits or harms each group according to whether the unweighted 
sum of project net benefits is positive or negative, regardless of the 
distributional impact of the project. Projects may be ranked, from the 
point of view of each individual, according to B* • The possibility that 
a project could benefit one group while harming another exists, but this 
possibility rests entirely on the nature of group preferences (the remote 
possibility that one or more of the K
i terms is negative) and not at all on 
the distributional impact of the project. 
Suppose that Ki < 0 for some i. Now consider a Bergson-Samuelson 
1 2 3
social welfare function W = W(U, U , U ), with derivatives W. > 0 for all 
J 
j. Then the welfare impact of a project is given by 
3 






* If V < 0 then a project for which B > O·reduces welfare. Similarly, 
i
raising each of they terms reduces welfare. This case seems scarcely 
worth considering but in this instance projects can be ranked inversely 
according to B* . Otherwise, with V > 0, as we expect, projects may be 
* ranked according to B even in the seemingly unlikely case where one or 
i i more of the H terms, or even the K terms, is negative. 
Intuitively, the existence of private benevolence implies that the 
fortunes of the various income groups are linked independently of the 
distributional impact of the project. The equilibrium welfare impact 
of a project on each group depends on the aggregate net wealth generated 
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by the project and not at all on the proportion of that aggregate net wealth 
accruing directly to that particular group. This implies that projects 
may be ranked, according to their welfare impact, by comparing the unweighted 
sums of their net benefits. That is·, 
sign (dW) c sign (B)* 
for each project. If there are two or more mutually exclusive projects for 
which B * > 0, then the one for which B* is greatest has the most favourable 
welfare impact. This result is independent of the detailed nature of the 
'social welfare function. It holds regardless of the degree to which the 
existing distribution of income is judged to he undesirable, whether this 
arejudgement is made before or after the effects of private charity 
taken into account. It holds even in the case, discussed at the end of 
the previous section, where some other distribution of income is Pareto 
superior to the existing one and where a redistribution of income would 
be unanimously approved. Finally, it holds even when private benevolence 
redistributes income in the opposite direction from the redistribution 
that the government would wish. 
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4. Tax-Deductible Charity 
Charitable donations are frequently tax-deductible. Since this 
changes the marginal optimality conditions determining the levels of 
charitable donations, the question arises of whether the introduction 
of a tax system possessing this feature will alter our conclusion that 
the distributional impact of a project should be disregarded. The answer 
to this question proves to depend on the way tax revenues are treated and on 
whether the receipts of charitable donations and project benefits are taxed. 
We look at the question from the point of view of a project evaluat0r 
for whom the tax system must be treated as given, regardless of its merits. 
The discussion is confined to an examination of the implications of a fixed 
tax schedule for benefit-cost analysis. 
We shall suppose, for now, that tax revenues represent a pure loss 
from the point of view of each income group. While there is presumably 
some other, governmental group benefiting from these revenues, for the time 
being their interests will be treated as lying outside the scope of our 
welfare analysis. This assumption will presently be relaxed. Let the 
margiaal proportional tax rates applying to groups 1, 2 and 3 be fixed at 
1 2 3t, t and t, respectively. Three alternative tax systems will be considered: 
Table 1: Three Alternative Tax Systems 
Charitable Charitable Project 
donations receipts returns 
Case ( 1) deductible taxed taxed 
Case ( 2) deductible taxed not taxed 
Case ( 3) deductible not taxed not taxed 
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Case ( 1): Charitable receipts and project returns taxed 
The change in the consumption of each group, previously given by 
equations (7) to (9) is now given by 
1 1 1 1de • - dv (1 - t) + B (1 - tl), (16) 
2 1 2) , ? 2 2 2dc • ).dv (l - t - c:V (1 - t ) + B (1 - t ) , (17) 
3 ? 3( 3) . 2 + B3 .dc = (1 - >.) av1 1 - t + av (1 - t-) (1 - t ) (18) 
respectively and summing we obtain 
3 i * 
= I: B ¥ B • (19) 
i=l 
The marginal optimality conditions applying to donations by groups 1 and 
2 (previously equations (4) and (5)) now become 
(20) 
and 
The analysis now proceeds exactly as before. The equilibrium 
solution corresponding to (12) is now 
i i * de • H B , i = 1, 2, 3 (22)
(1) 
We can omit detailed discussion of the Hi terms since they differ from 
(1,
1 
the H terms in (12) only by the presence of some multiplicative tax rates. 
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Their qualitative form, interpretation and likely sign in the same. The 
important feature of (22) is that the multiplicative term B 
ft 
is, as before, 
the unweighted sum of net project returns. Projects may he ranked, from 
the point of view of each group, accoiding to their aggregate net benefits, 
regardless of the initial distribution of project benefits or of the dis­
tribution of marginal tax rates. 
Charitable receipts taxed; project returns not taxed 
We now suppose the net benefits from projects to ta form 





The marginal optimality conditions (20) and (21) are unchanged. We elimi­
1 2nate the variables dv and dv from (23) to (25) 
3 i 3 
r de = r (26) 
i-=l i=l 
Proceeding as before, the resulting system gives the solution 
i = 1, 2, 3. (27) 
Again the Hi terms need not be discussed, but now the distributional 
( 2) 
impact of the project becomes important. If, as is frequently but not 
always the case, wealthier groups incur higher marginal tax rates 
1 2(t > t > t 3) then the appropriate weights to apply to the projects 
benefits received by richer groups exceed those applying for poorer groups. 
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This counterintuitive, not to mention reactionary, result is even stronger 
in case ( 3). 
Case (3): Charitable receipts and project returns not taxed. 
The technique of analysis is now sufficiently clear that we can 
pass directly to the main result, namely 
i i
de = H(3) B" , i = 1, 2, 3 (28) 
where 
B'' = B
1(1 - A+ A/(1 - t
2
) (29) 
(1 - t 
1
) 
Again, the detailed form of the Hi terms need not concern us, but
(3) 
since the term (1 - A+ A/(1 - t 2)) exceeds unity the premium applying to 
the returns of group 1 is now even higher than that obtained in case (2 ). 
These results may be understood intuitively by noting that the 
tax-deductibility of donations means that a dollar sacrificed by the donor 
generates more than a dollar for the recipient. At the margin, these 
quantities are, from the point of view of the donor, equally valuable. 
So far as groups 1 to 3 are concerned, this "magnification" at the margin 
is analogous to the return generated by an intertemporal investment. The 
impact of a new infusion of funds (a public project) on the net wealth of 
the three groups is measured by discounting the returns received by recipient 
(poorer) groups. This is analous to discounting the returns generated by 
public projects in later time periods, the discount rate depending on the 
rate of return available on intertemporal investments. When project returns 
are themselves tax-deductible (case (1)), these effects cancel out, but 
not otherwise. 
The above results for cases ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) should be treated with 
caution. This is especially clear when we relax the separation between 
groups 1 to 3 and the recipients of tax revenues. Define a new group, 
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group G, which receives tax revenues and which in addition either makes 
charitable donations to, or receives them from, some subset of the other 
three groups. Then we immediately return to our earlier result. Projects 
may be ranked, from the point of view of each of the four groups, according 
to the unweighted sum of their net benefits. 
To show this, we shall suppose ·that group G makes voluntary donations 
to group. 3. We will also allow the possibility that group G also receives 
benefits from public projects. The utility functions of the four groups 
are now expresse. d as ui = Ui(cl, c2 , c,3 cG) , i = 1, 2, 3, G, 
where c
G 
denotes the consumption of group G. We shall suppose that the 
tax system operates as in case ( 2) above and, for simplicity, that 
group G is untaxed. Group G's utility maximization gives 
G G 3UG = u
3 
(1 - t ) . (30) 
Equations (20), (21) and (23) to (25) apply as before, except that 
dvG(l - t 3) must now be added to the right-hand side of (25), where dvG 
is the change in the donations of group G, and in addition we have 
dcG = - dv1 (t1 - At 2 - (1 - >..)t 3) - dv2 (t 2 - t 3) - dvG(l - t 3) + BG ' (3l) 
Simply summing equations (23) to (25) and (31) we obtain 
3. 3i G 
i=l
r de + de '"' 
i=l
r - B** (32) 
We totally differentiate equations (20), (21) and (30) and together with 
(32) these give a four equation - four variable system with the solution 
de i = J i B** 
' i = 1, 2, 3, G. (33) 
The terms J i sum to unity and again we expect J i > 0 for all i, but the
multiplicative term B** is again the unweighted sum of project returns; 
projects should berankedwithout regard to their distributional impact. This 
result is also obtained in each of the other possible variants of the tax system. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
The focus of this paper is on the distribution of income between 
groups connected by private charitable donations from one to the other. 
lt studies the impact of public projects on the consumption of the various 
groups, taking into account the equilibrium adjustment of private charitable 
donations to the income effects of public projects. It is concluded that 
the returns from "small" public projects accruing to different groups 
connected in this way should be weighted equally in benefit-cost analysis, 
regardless of the degree to which their incomes differ and regardless of 
the precise form of the government's "social welfare" function. These 
results do not in any way require private charity to have equalized the 
distribution of income or to have moved substantially in that direction, 
and in fact they continue to apply when private charity redistributes 
income in the opposite direction from the redistribution the government 
would wish. 
Although these results are complicated by allowing charitable 
donations to be tax-deductible, these complications vanish once the 
group receiving tax revenues (the government) is connected, via charitahle 
donations, to other groups in the society. From a methodological point 
of view, these results are similar to those of the "rational expectations'' 
literature; laking account of the equilibrium impact that public policy 
decisions have on the decisions of individuals does not represent a mere 
-"refinement" to the analysis, but alters its conclusions fundamentally. 
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Footnotes 
* This research was conducted while the author was Visiting Fellow, 
Economic Growth Center, Yale University, on leave. from Monash 
University, Melbourne. The paper has benefitted substantially 
from the author's discussions with Brian n. Wright, but the 
author is responsible for the views presented and any errors. 
1The many advocates of differential weighting schemes include 
Weisbrod (1968), Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972), Little and 
Mirrlees (1974), Lal (1974) and Squire and Van der Tak (1975). 
2critics include Harberger (1971) and (1978), Parish (1976) and 
Ng (1978). Harberger (1978) provides a more extensive bibliography. 
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